University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1877

Griswold v. Bay City
Thomas M. Cooley

University of Michigan Law School

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/2411

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the State and Local Government
Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cooley, Thomas M., "Griswold v. Bay City" (1877). Articles. 2411.
https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/2411

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

The Central law journal
St. Louis, Mo. : [Soule, Thomas & Wentworth], 1874https://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065111906

Public Domain, Google-digitized
http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
We have determined this work to be in the public domain,
meaning that it is not subject to copyright. Users are
free to copy, use, and redistribute the work in part or
in whole. It is possible that current copyright holders,
heirs or the estate of the authors of individual portions
of the work, such as illustrations or photographs, assert
copyrights over these portions. Depending on the nature
of subsequent use that is made, additional rights may
need to be obtained independently of anything we can
address. The digital images and OCR of this work were
produced by Google, Inc. (indicated by a watermark
on each page in the PageTurner). Google requests that
the images and OCR not be re-hosted, redistributed
or used commercially. The images are provided for
educational, scholarly, non-commercial purposes.

THE CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL.

200

docket under the act of June 26, 1876, which was an
nounced at this term, and is reported in 3 Cent. L. J.
815.
For convenience it may be well to state the follow
ing again:
The bill was filed in the district court of
Boulder county, June 21, 1876; issue was joined July
24, 1876; the Territory of Colorado became a state by
of the president, August 1, 1876, and the
proclamation
last order made at the July term of the Boulder court
was entered August 21, 1876. After the motion to docket
the case in this court was denied, and on the 7th of
December, 1876,plaintiffs filed in the state court a peti
tion alleging that they are citizens of Massachusetts
and defendant is a corporation created by a law of the
Territory of Colorado, and other facts substantially as
required by the act of 1875 concerning the removal of
causes from state to federal courts.
A bond was also
filed with condition as required by that act, the suffi
ciency of which was not questioned in this court. After
wards (Dec. 9, 1876) plaintiffs filed in this court a tran
script of the files, record and proceedings in the Boul
der court and sought to have the cause referred.
Thereupon, December 11, defendant moved to dismiss,
which is here treated as a motion to remand.

I.

E. L.

Smith, for the motion;
Beddick, contra.

Hallett

A.

J

Poppleton and

J.

.J. :

This suit was brought in the district court of Boul
der county, under the late territorial government, and
the question here presented is, whether it may be re
moved into this court under the act of Congress of
March 3, 1875. In terms that act extends to cases then
pending

or thereafter

to be brought in any state court.
in any court, nor was
it afterwards brought in a state court, although it came
into such a court by operation of law on the admission
of the state sometime after it was begun.
It was ingeniously urged in the argument at the bar
that, by assenting to the jurisdiction of the state court,
plaintiffs did in fact bring the suit in that court ; but
The bringing of a suit
this will not bear examination.
is understood to mean the institution or commence
ment of it, and so the language is in R. S., § 639, on the
This occurred in this instance in a ter
same subject.
ritorial, not a state court. Pending the suit the char
acter of the court was changed into a state court, and
there being nothing in the record to show its federal
character, the court retained jurisdiction of it. 8. c.
3 Cent. L. J. 815.
Plaintiffs did not in any sense bring the suit in or
They found it there, where the
into the state court.
law had left it in the transition from a territorial to a
state government, and they consented to go on with it
in that Jurisdiction. In that way they elected to re
main in the state court ; but they did not in any reason
of the act of 1875 bring the suit in
able construction
This view is enforced by the circumstance
that court.
that Congress has provided a special way of transferring
causes on the admission of a state by general law (R. S.
§§, 567, 569, 704), and also in this instance by the act
establishing this court, June 26, 1876. This legislation,
relating to a particular class of cases and designed to
carry out the general purpose of the removal acts,
seems to proceed on the theory that the latter are not
applicable to case6 which originate in a territorial court.
If Congress had consigned all federal cases to the state
courts, plaintiffs would be within the reason, if not the
letter, of the removal acts. But this was not done; and
that which was done does not in any way tend to prove
that the removal acts are by construction to be ex
tended to cases like this — i. e., to cases not within their
If, however, this reasoning is unsound, there is
terms.
another obstacle to the removal of the cauBe.

This suit was not then pending

Accepting the act of 1875 as applicable to the case,
by the third section it is provided that the petition for
removal shall be filed in the state court, " before or at
the term at which said cause could be first tried, and
before the trial thereof." The term here referred to
appears to be that at which the cause may be tried or
heard on the merits according to the practice of the
court, without regard to the special circumstances of
the case, as whether the parties are readv for trial, and
the like.
a question of
we can not, in determining
Certainly
this kind, enter into every circumstance that may delay
or facilitate the progress of a cause, as whether there
are nice points to be decided, which require time for
consideration, whether the court was otherwise occu
would be in
pied, and so on. Such an investigation
ever)- way embarrassing and uncertain as to the re
sult, and therefore it may be dismissed as impracti
cable. We are then to inquire whether, according to
the practice of the court, this suit could have been
finally heard at the July term of the Boulder court,
without
reference to any of those circumstances
that have been mentioned as likely to retard its pro
gress. It appears that issue was joined on the 24th
day of July, 1876, and the court remained in session
for a period of twenty-eight days thereafter.
No time was allowed by rule of court or otherwise for
taking testimony, and we can not assume that any
It was claimed at the bar
specific time was necessary.
that our rule, 69, should govern, but that rule was not
Palmer v. Cowdrey, i
of force in the Boulder court.
Col. 1. So far as the record shows, the cause could
have been brought on at any time within the twentyeight days which remained of the term after issue
If the writer may speak from his own
was joined.
knowledge of the course of practice in the territorrial
courts, he feels bound to declare that it was entirely
regular to bring a cause to hearing at the term in
which issue was joined, and this was often done, es
It is true that impor
pecially in foreclosure suits.
tant suits often went over the term ; but this was owing
to the press of business, or other extraneous cause,
It seems, therefore,
and not to any rule of practice.
to remove the cause was uot in
that the application
apt time, not being made at the term when a hearing
could have been had.
For these reasons the motion to remand will be
allowed with costs.

Dillon,

I

Circuit Judge:

I am inclined to think the first ground
concur.
sound; but if, ujider the local law and practice, the
case could have been finally heard at the July term,
am clear that the application for removal should
then
have been made at that term, assuming that the act of
March 3, 1875, applies to the case.

I

Motion Sustained.

TAKEN FROM STREETS IN
GRADING— RIGHTS OK ADJOINING LOTOWNER.

MATERIAL

GRISWOLD

v. BAY CITY.

/Supreme Court of Michigan, January

Term, 1877.

Hon. T. M. Cooley, Chief Justice.
" J. V. Campbell,
" Isaac Marston, )>Associate Justices.
" B. F. Graves, J
1. Eight of Owners of adjoining Lots to Material
taken from Streets— Sale of Same BT City.— In grad

ing a street for the purpose of paving, It was necessaryto
remove earth which the city had no occasion for, and the

THE CENTEAL LAW JOURNAL.
streetcommissioner sold the same to a party who removed
andused it. In an action to recover the purchase-price
the purchaser defended, claiming that the city did not own
theearth, but that it was owned by the adjoining lot-owners.
There was no 6howing that the earth was of any peculiar
value,nor did it appear whether it constituted a part of the
original soil, or was earth which the city had previously
placedin the street. Held, that the defence was not main
tainable.
2. Right op City— Waiver.— Where soil is thus taken
from a street in grading it, the city has the right to make
useof it in improving the streets in any part of the city.
If it is not needed for this purpose, and the city disposes
of it by sale without objection by the lot-owners, it will be
presumed, such lot-owners waived any objection they
might have made.
3. Whether Soil Taken from a STREETand not needed
by the city would rightfully belong to adjacent lot-owners,
is not decided.

Error

to Bay Circuit.
J., delivered

the opinion of the court:
Defendant in error brought an action of assumpsit to
recover the agreed price for a quantity of dirt sold and
delivered under an express contract made by its street
commissioner with plaintiff in error.
It was shown upon the trial in the court below that
the city, for the purpose of paving one of its streets,
lowered the grade thereof, and in doing so it became
necessary to make excavations and remove a large
quantity of the earth in the street, which, not being
needed for city purposes, was sold to plaintiff in error
and others. The plaintiff in error also offered to show
that the owners of lots alongside of the street never
consented to, or had anything to do with removing the
dirt, or selling the same; that the expense of paving
said street was paid out of the highway funds of the city,
and by special assessment on the property along said
street. This evidence was rejected. Certain plats were
offered in evidence to show that this property had never
been legally platted; but It was admitted, that the pro
prietors had sold and conveyed lots in said city by
deeds duly acknowledged, referring to said plats.
It is insisted that the owner of the lands, over which
a 9treet not legally platted is laid, retains the fee and
with the public enjoyment,
all rights not incompatible
and that, while the city might use this dirt for city
purposes, it could not sell it; that one of the main
and lending elements of a sale, viz. title in the city to
the dirt, was lacking, and therefore the city could not
recover.
There are several difficulties with the defense BCt up.
We can not lose sight of the main features of this case,
and dispose of the controversy with exclusive reference
to the theory that the owner of the lots adjoining
owned to the center of the street subject only to the
public easement, that the title to the soil removed was
in them, and that the city had no authority to sell the
same. If it appeared that the property taken was of
special value, it might perhaps be fairly inferred that
the owners of the adjoining lots did not consent to a
But where, as
sale or relinquish their rights therein.
in this case, the property does not appear to have had
any special or peculiar value, and was taken, used and
disposed of by the city without objection, it is but fair
to presume that the adjoining proprietors took no in
terest whatever in the disposition that was being made
of it, and made no claim either for the soil or its pro
ceeds. In such a case, where the party has received
what he bargained for, in an action to recover the
price agreed upon, it is not sufficient for him to show,
in order to defeat the action, that the owners of the
adjoining lots did not consent to the removal and sale;
he should go farther and show that they forbade the
sale. And even if he had shown this to have been the
fact, it is not at all clear that such would have consti
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The record shows
tuted a valid defense in this action.
the soil to have been taken indiscriminately from all
along the line of the street. Under such circumstances
it would be very difficult for the several owners to trace
into the possession of plaintiff in error that portion of
the soil taken from off the street in front of their lots
respectively, and maintain an action against him either
for the identical soil taken or its value. It may be
worthy of serious consideration whether their remedy,
if any, would not he against the commissioner who re
moved the soil, or the city; hut upon this point we
express no opinion.
It may be a question admitting of some doubt, also,
whether there is in fact anything in the record tending
to show that the dirt sold and delivered was a part of
the soil excavated in grading the streets for pavement.
The fact that the person who made the contract with
plaintiff in error, was, and had been for a number of
and as such had charge of
years, street commissioner,
the inference
this street, would not fully warrant
For ought that ap
assumed by the plaintiff in error.
pears, the dirt in question may before then have been
placed upon this street by the city; certainly there is
nothing to show that it ever formed a part of the
original soil over which this street passed, or that the
owners of property fronting upon said street had or
claimed any interest whatever, at any time, therein.
We can not assume that any other person having an
interest in the dirt sold, or that the city, by its commis
sioner, did not in fact have full authority to sell and
But we need not
deliver the same to plaintiff in error.
dispose of this case on any such technical reason.
If, in grading this street, it became necessary to
remove any soil, the city would have had an undoubted
right to use the same in grading that or any other street
in the city. In case it did not desire it for such pur
pose, and the owner of the property from in front of
which it has been taken did not, then the city would
have a clear right to remove it, and might in so doing
sell or dispose of it in any way it considered proper.
The judgment must be affirmed with costs.

Note. — Several cases have recently been decided, in
which have been involved the respective rights of the pub
lic and of adjacent lot-owners in any material that may not
be required in its original situs in the public way for the
purpose of constructing the way, or of keeping it in re
pair, and the questions are of sulllcicnt Importance to Jus
It is conceded on all
tify their being notice 1 together.
hands that the owner of the land, over which the public
passes, retains at the common law the fee and all rights of
properly not incompatible with the public enjoyment of the
easement. Lade v. Shepherd, 2 Str. 1004;Goodtitle v. Alker, 1 Burr. 133; Grose v. West, 7 Taunton, 39; Doe v.
Pearsy, 7 B. ft C. S04; U. S. v. Harris, 1 Sumner, 21; Harris
v. Elliott, 10Pet. 25; Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 498;
" Every use to which
Chatham v. Brainerd, 11 Conn. 60.
the land may be applied, and all the profits which may be
derived from it consistently with the continuance of the
easement, the owner can lawfully claim." Parsons, C. J.,
in Perley v. Chandler, 6 Mass. 454,456; Lauc v. Kennedy,
13Ohio, N. 8. 42; Phifer v. Cox, 21Ohio, N. S. 248; Higgins
v. Reynolds, 31 N. Y. 151; Holden v. Shattuck, 34Vt. 336;
Cole v. Drew, 44 Vt. 49; Graves v. Shattuck, 35 X. H. 257;
Chamberlain v. Enfield, 43N. H. 356.
The herbage in the highway belongs to the owner of the
adjoining lands, and he may maintain trespass against one
whose cattle graze upon it (Stackpole v. Healy, 16 Mass.
33; Cool v. Crommet, 1 Shcii. 250; Avery v. Maxwell, if*.
H. 36; Woodruff v. Xeal, 28 Conn. 165), unless the law un
der which the highway was laid out contemplates the run
ning at large of cattle in the highway. Tonawanda R. R.
Co. v. Munger, 5 Denio, 255. The growing trees in the
highway also belong to the adjoining owner, except as they
are needed for the purpose of making the way (Adams v.
Emerson, 6 Pick. 56; Sanderson v. Haverstick, 8 Pa. St.
294; Overman v. May, 35 Iowa, 89; Commissioners, etc., v.
Beckwith, 10 Kas. 603),and if the highway officer sell trees
growing in the road, and they are cut without necessity,
they are liable in trespass for so doing. Clark v. Dasso, 34

Brickeix, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court:
The first section of the bankrupt law of 1841pro
vided:

"All

persons whatsoever,

in any state,
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a

which shall not have been created In consequence of
defalcation as public officer, or as executor, adminis
trator, guardian, or trustee, or while acting in any
other fiduciary capacity," should, on compliance with
discharge from the payment
its terms, receive
debts. The exception was of debts, from the opera
tion of the discharge;
not of persons owing such
In Chapman
debts, from the privileges of the law.
v. Forsyth,
How. 202, the Supreme Court of the
United States determined that debt due from factor
sale of cotton,
to bis principal, for moneys received on
fiduciary
was not
debt created by defalcation in
capacity, and was within the operation of the bank
rupt's discharge. The decision was followed in AustiU
Marshall v. Crawford,
Ala. 335. It was urged by
counsel, in the argument of that case, that the law
this state, the parties residing and contracting, and the
agency having been executed here, must fix the char
acter of the relation of factors to their principals, and
of the debts due from them in the execution of their
willful
The statute punishing criminally
agency.
factor, of the goods or moneys of his
conversion, by
was insisted, fixed the character of the
principal,
debt due from him, as created in consequence of de
falcation while acting in
It wai
fiduciary capacity.
said by the court, the pleadings did not disclose the
offence punishable by the statute; but, independent
the operation and construction
that consideration,
the bankrupt law must be the same all over the United
States, not varied by the local laws of the several states
must be
and the meaning of the terms employed in
ascertained from the common law.
5117of the Rev. Sts.) of the present
The 33d section
bankrupt law declares: "No debt created by the fraud
or embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his defalcation
as
public officer, or while acting in any fiduciary
character, shall be discharged by proceedings in bank
claim
ruptcy," etc. The current of decision is, that
factor, for withholding the proceeds of the
against
sales of goods consigned to him to be sold on commis
sion, is
debt contracted by him in
fiduciary cliardischarge
acter, excepted from the operation of
The decisions are collected in Bump on
bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy (8th Ed.), 724. See also Treadwell v. Holloway, 48 Cal. 547; 8. C, 12 Nat. Bank. Reg. 81. The
difference of decision under the present law, from that
prevailing under the law of 1841, founded on the dif
thus
ference in the phraseology, and the reason of
the
expressed by Judge Blatcbiord, whose opinion
authority on which the other and subsequent concur
"
The act of 1841 excluded from
ring opinions rely.
its benefits all persons owing debts created in conse
defalcation as public officer, or as execu
quence of
tor, administrator, guardian or trustee, or while acting
The Supreme Court held,
in any fiduciary capacity.'
in Chapman v. Forsyth, that
discharge under the
act of 1841 did not release the bankrupt from any
such debts, and that no debt fell within the descrip
tion of
debt created by
defalcation while acting
in any other fiduciary capacity, unless
was created
defalcation while acting in
by
capacity of the
same class and character as the capacity of executor,
administrator,
guardian and trustee.
The court held
that the language of the act of 1841 was not broad
enough to include every fiduciary
capacity, but was
limited to fiduciary capacities of
specified standard
or character. That was clearly so under that act. But,
iu the act of 1867, the language seems to have been
debt
made so broad as to extend to
intentionally
created by
defalcation of the bankrupt, and while
a

it

is is

is

a

in

a

a

a

a

'

1

a

it

a

$

a

A debt due from
factor for the proceeds of goods sold
is not within sec. 33 of the Bankrupt Act (Rev. Stats.
5117),which provides that "no debt created by the fraud
. or embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his defalcation as
public officer, or while acting in any fiduciary character, shall
be discharged by any proceedings in bankruptcy."
In re
Seymour, X. B. R. 29,disapproved. Cronan v. Cottiug, 104
Mass. 245,followed.

a

W.1K

Chief Justice.
Associate Justices.

a

Brickell,

a

Gia'

a

"

{

Hon. R. C.

v. CADE.

of Alabama, December, 1870.

a

WOOLSEY
Supreme Court

a
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BANKRUPTCY— FIDUCIARY DEBTS.
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Mich. 86. See further, Jackson v. Hathaway, 15 Johns, 447;
Babcock v. Lamb, 1 Cowen, 238; Williams v. N. Y. C. R. B.
Co., 16N. Y. 103; Dubuque v. Malony, 9 Iowa, 460; Dubuque
v. Benson, 23 Iowa, 248; Whiter. Godfrey, 97 Mass. 472:
Worden,
Bliss t. Ball, 99 Mass. 597; Makepeace
N. H.
16; Woodrlng v. Forks Town, 28Pa. St. 355; Bead v. Leeds,
19Conn. 182; Kellogg v. Malin, 50 Mo. 500. In Oodman v.
Evans, Allen, 308, was decided that the owner of land
might maintain an action against an adjoining owner who
bay window extending over his line, notwithstand
built
ing that portion of the land covered by the bay window
was laid out and used as highway. In Kentucky, it has
highway
been decided that the owner of land over which
runs, may work mines therein, not interfering with the
Bush. 126.
public use. West Covington v. Freking,
The question is different somewhat when the public way
is
city or village street, and where the law under which
it has been laid out appropriates not an easement merely,
but the title in fee. It has been decided in Iowa, in such
case, that the complete ownership and dominion passed to
the munincipal corporation by such an appropriation, and
that,
deposit of minerals should exist beneath the sur
face and be worked by the adjoining proprietor, the cor
poration might recover from him the value of what should
be taken from it. Des Moines v. Hall, 24Iowa, 234; see also
Milburn v. Cedar Bapids, 12 Iowa, 246. Compare Moses v.
Pittsburg, etc., E. B. Co. 21 Hi. 516; West v. Bancroft, 32 Vt.
367; Ohio, etc., R. B. Co. v. Applegate,
Dana, 289; Hinchman v. Patterson, etc., B. Co.,
C. E. Green, 76; State
v. Laverack, 34N. J., 201.
We do not find that this peculiar question has been
passed upon elsewhere under like circumstances but the
view token in Michigan of the public rights in streets un
der statutes, which vest the fee in the county where lands
are dedicated to the public use by a town plat, seems to be
It Is conceded that
different from that taken in Iowa.
dedication or an appropriation for street purposes Is not
for purposes of passage merely, but for all the public pur
poses for which it is customary or proper to make use of
city or village streets. Warren v. Grand Haven, 30Mich.
24. But from this case, as well as others which have not
passed explicitly upon the question, the inference is fairly
dcducible that the public would not be recognized as hav
ing the fee, except for public purposes. In Cuming v.
Praug, 24Mich. 514, was decided that the city authorities
had uo right to empower contractor, for the improvement
street in one part of the city, to take for the purpose
of
gravel from an alley in another part of the city, and that
the owner of the lot bounded on the alley might maintain
an action for the value of the gravel taken. Compare Del
phi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90. The decision would probably not
have been the same, had the locus been a street instead of
an alley there are some important differences between the
two. See People v. Jackson,
Mich. 432; Tillman v. Peo
ple, 12 Mich. 401. In Bissell v. CoUins, 28 Mich. 277,the
right of the city, in making street improvement, to take the
natural material within the street limits and distribute
wherever
was needed in completing the work, was fully
recognized. But this right would hare existed, had the
public hod an easement only. New Haven v. Sargent, 38
Conn. 50.
The principal case was decided on
somewhat narrow
ground, but
approaches
question which there will
probublv be occasion to consider in future cases.
T. M. C.
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